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1. INTRODUCTION
ABSTRACT
Islamic State (IS) terrorist networks in Syria and Iraq pose threats
to national security. IS’ exploitation of social media and digital
strategy plays a key role in its global dissemination of
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. However, systematic
research on Islamic terrorist communication via social media is
limited. Our research investigates the question: How do IS
members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication:
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment? Theoretically, we
drew on microeconomic network theories to develop a theoretical
framework for multi-sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic
terrorist communication environment. Empirically, we collected
3,039 tweets posted by @shamiwitness who was identified in
prior research as “an information disseminator” for the IS cause.
Methodologically, we performed social network analysis, trend
and content analyses of the tweet data. We find strong evidence
for Shamiwitness-intermediated multi-sided Twitter networks of
international mass media, regional Arabic mass media, IS fighters,
and IS sympathizers, supporting the framework’s utility.
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President Barack Obama earlier referred to Islamic State (IS) –
Islamic terrorist networks of predominantly Sunni Muslim
extremists, foreign fighters, and sympathizers – as a “Junior
Varsity” version of Al Qaeda” [25, p. 1]. Since then the rapid rise
and resilience of the IS militants in Syria and Iraq against the USled coalition of 60-plus nations, however, seems to pose a serious
threat. Furthermore, IS seems to deploy social media platforms
effectively and strategically for terrorism communication; namely
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. In this research, we
hold that a much greater threat may be posed by the IS multiethnic military force powered by IS strategic use of multi-sided
Twitter networks in “the new digital age” [54, p.4].
There are two reasons for our concerns. First, both al-Qaeda and
IS hold the political goal of establishing a new Islamic state (or
“caliphate”) where Sharia law is the highest authority and jihad is
sanctioned. Importantly, while Osama bin Laden, leader of alQaeda, failed to achieve this political goal during his lifetime,
Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, leader of IS, in Mosul, Iraq on July 4, 2014,
proclaimed himself as “Caliph Ibrahim”. Al-Baghadi proclaims
that he has the absolute power under Allah over the “Islamic
State” and all Muslims on earth, inciting them to obey him in
waging global jihad against all Allah’s enemies [2]. This is an
open call for extreme political violence as the duty of all faithful
Muslims, not only against infidels (those who are unfaithful to
Islam), but also against Shia Muslims and moderate Sunni
Muslims. Immediately, Sunni-ruled Jordan declared IS as a
“direct and immediate threat to our national security” [5, p. 1].
Similarly, Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia expressed a view that Abu
Bakr al-Baghadi’s efforts to create a multi-ethnic military force
under the banner of his Islamic fundamentalism ideology and
polity as a serious threat to national security [4]. These threat
perceptions of the regional powers echo those of the Western
nations, having resulted in 60-plus members of the anti-Islamic
State coalition in September, 2014 to fight against the IS military
force in Syria and Iraq [45].
Second, while al-Qaeda also exploited mass media and the
Internet for terrorism propaganda [12, 13], IS exploits the
explosive speed and increasing reach of global social media
platforms in luring hearts and minds of younger generations of the
Muslims and the Westerners alike to fight with its IS multi-ethnic
force in Syria and Iraq to extend the political power and
dominance of the “Islamic State” worldwide. A 2014 United
Nations Security Council report shows that 15,000 foreign
fighters from more than 80 countries are fighting with the IS in
Syria and Iraq [3]. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
however, gives higher estimates of 20,000 – 31,500 fighters in
Syria and Iraq [1]. These statistics seem to indicate that IS can
recruit continuous flows of new fighters to wage war against the

US-led coalition with 60-plus nations as well as against Kurdish
fighters and Iraqi military force, although the Pentagon claims that
US-led air strikes killed several hundred IS fighters in and around
the Syrian town of Kobane in October, 2014 [41].
Despite the potential greater threat posed by the IS’ overarching
political goal of the worldwide Islamic State, military capability,
and exploitation of Twitter networks in terrorism communication,
however, there is a clear paucity of scientific research – both
theoretical and empirical research – on social media use by IS.
Therefore, we address a central research question in this research:
How do IS members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism
communication: propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment? In
answering this research question we strategically selected the
Twitter account of @shamiwitness. Prior research [16, 33] has
identified “Shami Witness” as someone who had been closely
linked to the IS terror networks. On December 13, 2014, Mehdi
Masroor Biswas behind this popular and prolific @shamiwitness
was arrested by Indian police for spreading the views of Islamic
State [9, 60]. We collected a sample of 3,039 tweets posted by
@shamiwitness during the period of October 6 to October 27,
2014. We then performed a social network analysis of this tweet
dataset to examine the emergent structure of connectedness and
communication content of the Twitter networks formed by
@shamiwitness and his followers.
Since terrorism is multi-faced, there exist different definitions in
the literature. However, in this research we adapt the 2012 US
Department of Defense (DOD) definition of terrorism as the use
of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to implant and
spread fear so as to coerce or politically influence governments
and/or citizens in the pursuit of goals which are political,
religious, and/or ideological [64]. In other words, we distinguish
terrorism from terrorizing (e.g., terrorizing the public through
random violence by an individual or a group with mental health
problems).

Hussein during the Iraq War [35]. The US lists IS as a
predominantly Sunni terrorist and jihadist group.
Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad
Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, hailed from Samarra, in the Sunni Triangle
north of Baghdad, which was heavily affected by US bombing
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, AQI, and
the insurgency [24].
As stated in our Introduction section, al-Baghadi claims that a
caliphate – a single, transnational “Islamic State” based on sharia
has been established. Despite the US-led coalition airstrikes
against the IS positions, IS controls a large part of Iraq including
Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. The area (in solid orange
color) in Figure 1 shows a sizable part of Iraq and Syrian border
under the control of IS and IS support (as of January, 2015) [8].
The confirmed airstrikes by US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq
since June, 2014 are shown by dark blue bubble, where the size
shows the number of strikes. On the map below, the 4th largest
bubble (40 strikes) at the bottom right corner indicates the number
of airstrikes in and around Baghdad, while the largest bubble (600
strikes) at the top left corner indicates that in and around Kobane.
A total of 880 in Iraq and a total of 665 strikes in Syria were
conducted by US-led coalition, including the regional Sunni-ruled
nations [8].
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The structure of this paper is organized as follows: the next
section presents our research background on the Islamic State and
@shamiwitness. Drawing on a review of the relevant literatures,
in the third section, we discuss a theoretical framework for
examining two emergent social media-enabled structural
mechanisms that amplify terrorism communication in the context
of radical Islamic terrorist networks. In the fourth section, we
describe our research methods. In the fifth section, we present key
research findings. In the sixth section, we discuss the sociopolitical and socio-technical implications of our key findings that
may improve the government practice in countering social mediaenabled terrorism communication towards safeguarding the
national security and contributing to the political order of the
Middle East. Finally, the seventh section presents our conclusions,
including the research limitations of this paper and the future
research directions for social media-enabled terrorism
communication in e-government research field.

2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Islamic State
Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (IS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has
its origin in al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which engaged in the Iraqi
insurgence against the 2003 US-led invasion to oust Saddam

Figure 1. IS control of Syria and Iraq [8]
IS has been reported as “the world’s richest terrorist group” and
“controls more firepower and territory than any jihadist
organization in history” [55, p. 8]. IS has seized control of bank
assets in Mosul, took control of Syria’s largest oil field, and
generates the illegal revenue of up to $3 million crude oil sales per
day [36]. However, a new and emergent threat of Islamic State is
the dynamic capability of IS, through strategic use of Twitter

networks in the new digital age, to connect globally with younger
generations of Muslim and Western would-be terrorist fighters
and sympathizers and to lure them to support its IS multi-ethnic
military force through terrorism communication: political
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment.

accomplishment of the terrorist goals. In this section we explain
each construct identified in this theoretical framework.

Despite the 1,545 confirmed airstrikes against the IS positions as
of January, 2015 [8], a 2014 United Nations Security Council
report shows that 15,000 foreign fighters from more than 80
countries are fighting with the IS in Syria and Iraq [3]. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), however, gives higher
estimates 20,000 – 31,500 fighters in Syria and Iraq [1].

2.2 Shamiwitness
In their research on Syrian foreign fighter networks, Carter et al.
[16] examined 2,405 Twitter users whom foreign fighters on
Twitter followed, during the observation period of nearly 12
months, ending February, 2014. This generated a social-media
network of 2,405 nodes. Of this network, 1,778 (or 74%) of
Twitter users were followed by only one foreign fighter, whereas
a minority of 46 (or 1.9%) attracted 10 or more followers. Of the
46, 32 Twitter users were more closely examined. Unsurprisingly,
the study failed to find any official Twitter account that had been
registered by any known terrorist group. Importantly, however,
the study found that @shamiwitness had the great number of
followers, and hence Carter et al. [16] considered Shamiwitness as
the most popular and influential Twitter user to the foreign
fighters in Syria.
Carter et al. [16, p. 15] identified Shamiwitness as one of “the
new information disseminators” who “were not foreign fighters
nor do they have any official links to jihadist organizations.
Instead, they broadly support the Islamist project in Syria, and in
that respect, provide both moral and political support to the cause
by establishing themselves as reliable sources of information.”
However, they did not provide any information content generated
by @shamiwitness. Therefore, it is unclear about a detailed
communication strategy or mechanism through which
@shamiwitness provides both moral and political support to the
IS cause.
Of the most popular and influential Twitter users listed in their
report, all but the @shamiwitness account has been shut down by
Twitter prior to our observation period beginning October 6,
2014. Finally, Twitter closed the @shamiwitness account upon his
arrest on December 13, 2014 but took the unprecedented action to
reinstate the account for archival access. In his Twitter profile,
@shamiwitness attempts to underscore his independence from
Islamic State terrorist networks: “RTs ≠ endorsements.” At this
point, although it remains unclear whether or not he is a cardcarrying member of IS terrorist networks, his arrest indicates that
his Twitter networks were viewed by Indian Police as having
produced value to IS terrorist networks.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Figure 2 below shows our theoretical framework for examining
multi-sided Twitter networks in the global Islamic terrorist
communication environment that can amplify terrorism
communication effectiveness. We submit that the structural
mechanisms reshape the core communication operations of
Islamic terrorist networks; namely terror propaganda,
radicalization of Islamic religion, and recruitment of new jihadists
and fighters to accomplish terrorism goals. In this research we
centrally focus on global multi-sided Twitter networks in
terrorism communication, without direct reference to the

Figure 2. Framework for multi-sided Twitter networks in the
global Islamic terrorist communication environment

3.1 Social Media Use by Terrorist Networks
Historically, terrorist networks have used various media, and
recently, the Internet, as propaganda and recruitment instruments
for terrorist activities [12, 13, 18, 30, 43, 66]. The Internet
websites, the globalization of communications via emails, smart
phones and tablets, among other ICT tools, and the digitization of
media, however, have radically reshaped the structure and
capability of terrorism communication. Importantly, using the
Internet, terrorist networks have overcome the limitations of
traditional mass media publishing; they have gained greater
control over a quick, inexpensive, and anonymous means of
terrorism communication, through which their political, religious,
or ideological messages can reach new audiences around the
world [18].
Using social media platforms, especially Twitter and Facebook,
with 284 million and 1.35 billion monthly active users worldwide
(in the 3rd quarter 2014), respectively [57, 58], the terrorism
communication landscape can be radically reshaped by the speed,
reach, affordance, and ease of uploading voice, text and imagery
data via mobile devices for immediate visualization effects. It has
been reported that terrorist networks [59] and lone wolf terrorists
[17] alike have seized an unprecedented opportunity to engage
wider audiences with their extremist ideologies and terrorism
actions. The Syrian Civil War against the Shia-dominated Bashar
al-Assad government has been powered by social media use by
foreign fighters: “Already, considered the most socially mediated
conflict in history.” [16, p. 7].

3.2 Multi-Sided Twitter Networks
Social-media
networks
are
computer-mediated
virtual
communities formed by users/account holders of a social media
platform, such as Twitter, to share information, common interests,
needs, or purposes. For example, a social-media network of
@shamiwitness is formed by his posting a tweet when it is replied
or re-tweeted by another Twitter account holder. On the voluntary
basis, some of these network members produce user-generated
information content, including text, voice and imagery data, for
the use and the re-use by other network members. In this regard,

social-media networks behave much like other network goods,
such as mobile-phone networks, digital-TV networks, eBay,
Skype, and DropBox.
Network goods are normally subject to network effects [31].
Positive network effects are present when a user’s benefit from a
product/service depends not only on product/service
characteristics but also on the network [size] of other users who
also adopt or use the same product/service [19]. Prior research
distinguishes intrinsic benefits that arise from product/service
characteristics from extrinsic benefits that derive from actions of
others [11, 53].
Entrepreneurs of technology platforms and network goods who
play an intermediary role and create value primarily by enabling
interactions and information exchanges between two (or more)
distinct types of affiliated consumers are referred to as two-sided
networks (or multi-sided platforms) in microeconomic literature
[19, 22]. These information intermediaries normally have several
levers of control influencing managing product/service design and
the intensity of network effects [11].

In this new and complex eco-systems of two-sided and multisided networks [22, 47], new roles of information intermediaries
have emerged to aggregate benefits of different network users [11,
34]. While prior research [16, p. 14] has described the role played
by @shamiwitness as one of “the new information disseminators”
who “were not foreign fighters nor do they have any official links
to jihadist organizations”.

3.3 Terrorist Propaganda
Propaganda is a major output of many terrorist networks and a
long-standing priority for Al Qaeda [56]. Propaganda is defined as
“information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to
promote a political cause or point of view” [44]. Terrorist
networks use campaigns of terrorist violence as “the propaganda
of the deed” [14, p. 364] or the propaganda by the ([violent] deed)
to achieve operational-level tactics at global and local levels. On
the one hand, terrorist networks use the propaganda by the
[violent] deed targeted against society at the global level:
•
•
•
•

To spread fear [63]
To intimidate Western public opinion [48, 61]
To support the moral legitimacy of terrorism violence [52]
To engage wider audiences with terrorism ideologies and
actions and to shift their perspectives [59] - for example, by
reframing suicide attacks as martyrdom operations [15]

Prior research on network goods would suggest that one strategy
network platform owners, such as Twitter, and/or individual
network operators, such as @shamiwitness, can pursue to increase
users’ benefits is (1) by controlling network operations to
increase intrinsic benefits through enhanced information quality,
reputation, and other value-added services to attract new account
holders (network size) and (2) by increasing extrinsic benefits. In
order to increase the extrinsic benefits, @shamiwitness, for
example, can entice his social-media network users to actively
engage by issuing their own tweets, replying to his tweets or
retweeting his tweets to their own “followers” (who are not
members of the @shamiwitness network but belong to separate
social-media networks). Therefore, for a network good whose
product/service quality is shaped by the actions of other users (the
network effect) [11], the value of the @shamiwitness Twitter
account seems to be a function of content and information quality
he himself produces and of those his social-media network users
co-produce. In other words, the value creation process is dynamic
and interactive in nature, and we submit that the value seems to be
co-produced by the entire social-media network that is ever
dynamically changing. In other words, social media platforms are
necessary but not sufficient to create such value; social network
operators’ strategy and uers’ actions matter.

On the other hand, they use terrorist propaganda targeted largely
towards the Islamic populations (1.5 billion worldwide) at the
local level:
• To generate support within the Muslim communities [61] and a
target population [14]
• To establish an emotional connection with the targeted audience
[51]
• To provide collective identity that motivates terrorism violence
[48] and to cultivate an identity as fighters of the jihad [62]
• To promote common knowledge of terrorism ideologies and
violence in the decentralized, loosely networked structure of
today's global jihadist organizations [28]

Network effects can operate in a one-sided network of users, such
as, Skype, where network users have only a user role in the
network) or in cross-sided (two-sided or multi-sided) networks. In
the case of two-sided networks [20, 27], there are two distinct
populations of users who form networks, and a user’s benefits in
one network are dynamically influenced by the size of the cross
network. For example, digital-TV networks represent two-sided
network goods [47], where a network of digital-TV network users
may be deeply interested in the size and actions of the cross
network of developers. Moreover, a one-sided network good can
evolve into a two-sided network. For example, YouTube, a singlesided network good of users differentiates two roles each of which
forms a different network of content viewers or content providers.
The value of the network of YouTube viewers is created not by
other viewers but by the cross network of content providers.
Similarly, LinkedIn evolved from a one-sided network of
professionals to a two-sided network of professionals and
corporations.

In the new digital age, the impact of the propaganda by the deed
could be greatly amplified through the social media platforms
such as YouTube and Facebook that support easy uploads of usergenerated content such as extremely violent videos and
photographs. Furthermore, Twitter has been used to drive
terrorism communications over other social media platforms
among the jihadists in Syria and Iraq [33].

As the list above indicates, we can identify at least two categories
of the target of the propaganda by the deed: external (the first
four) vis-à-vis internal (the last four) networks of people, from a
perspective of a terrorist network. The literature also underscores
the central role of the media in supporting the propaganda by the
[violent] deed, since terrorism is essentially a political
communication. In fact, in the digital age, the increasing
symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists has been
examined [21, 48] and the effective use of media-jihad by alQaeda [63].

While the literature on social media use in terrorism is still new,
the question of who controls access and content of social-media
networks on Twitter is mixed. As discussed earlier in our
Background section, Carter et al. (2014) [16] view
@shamiwitness as playing a role of information disseminator for
Islamic State terrorist networks. In a study of Twitter use by 59
Western fighters in Syria from January through March 2014,

social network analysis indicates the controlling role played by
feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the
insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts
[33].

3.4 Radicalization
Radicalization refers to increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings,
and behaviors in support of political violence in a context of
strong group identification and response to perceived threat to the
in-group [39]. Based on this definition, we can argue that
extremism Islamic propaganda can radicalize, for example, the
target young Islamic males by strengthening the in-group
identification (e.g., radical Sunni Muslims) and hatred against
other groups, and by magnifying the external threats from other
groups (e.g., political and moral decay of the US and oppressive
Shia-ruled Syria’s Assada administration). Terrorist networks also
attempt to radicalize the population by attacking a government
and provoking a counterterrorism response [14]. IS in particular
through its online recruitment magazine, Dabiq, to have glorified
a self-claimed preacher, Man Haron Monis as “as one of the
jihadists ("mujahidin") of the Islamic State” [42]. A lone wolf,
Monis, demanded a black flag of IS and killed two of his hostages
during his Sydney siege [23]. Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani,
the official spokesman for the Islamic State (IS) incites random
“lone wolf” jihad attacks against citizens of US-led coalition
nations: "If you can kill a disbelieving American or European especially the spiteful and filthy French - or an Australian, or a
Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging
war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a
coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill
him in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for
anyone's advice and do not seek anyone's verdict." [42, p. 1].
Despite the limited empirical studies on individual processes of
Islamic radicalization, extant case studies and newspaper articles
seem to indicate two plausible pathways to radicalization: (1)
political influence of extremist Islamic preachers or spiritual
leaders [10, 38, 40], terrorist training, and combat experience in a
physical environment [29, 40] and (2) “virtual terrorist
radicalization” via YouTube [6] characterized by violent
propaganda in a virtual community of hatred and violence through
the Internet [12, 48, 50] and Twitter [33]. Pisoiu (2013) argues for
the importance of intentional and developmental factors, including
the emergence of new trans-cultural identities and generational
change [37, 46] and social experiences and discursive interactions
[65], rather than the traditional focus on socioeconomic and
structural factors such as economic and political grievance, to
more comprehensively understand violent Islamic radicalization.
Given only 20% of the radicalized terrorists were influenced by
extremist Islamic preachers or spiritual leaders, the potential
threat from the online radicalization process through social media
in the new digital age needs to be better understood for effective
public policy approaches.

3.5 Terrorist Recruitment
Islamic terrorist recruitment refers to enticing young, similarly
situated people to engage in terrorizing and fighting the Islamic
jihad war [32]. Despite his family background (Jewish father and
Catholic mother), Adam Yahiye Gadahn, a 25-year-old American,
converted to Islam at the age of 17 and adopted increasingly
radical political views through the close associations with radical
Islamic spiritual leaders [40]. Gadahn was recruited by al-Qaeda
and later became active on YouTube as a leading voice of As-

Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm, with violent threats against
Americans on streets [40].
While hard-core members such as Gadahn are rarely recruited via
social media, the explosive growth of Internet penetration rate,
social media penetration rate, and estimated 1.5 billion Muslim
population worldwide, together with the on-going political
conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and African nations, terrorist
networks exploit social media platforms such as Twitter,
YouTube, MySpace and Facebook and new youth cultures to
recruit new members and new jihad war fighters [40]. However,
there is a lack of academic research on online terrorist recruitment
using social media platforms in the literature.
In contrast, there are numerous mass media reports on
sophisticated use of social media by IS fighters in Syria and Iraq
to recruit new fighters and promote terrorist messages of violence
via Twitter, YouTube and Facebook [49]. This may be explained
by the ABC report on the presence of a media arm of IS with a
sophisticated digital strategy for increased visibility, global
dissemination of propaganda, magnified image of power and
threat, and enhanced attractiveness of IS for recruitment [49].
As Adam Yahiye Gadahn played the propaganda role of a
modern-day Tokyo Rose for al-Qaeda’s media arm on YouTube
[40], many of the estimated 3,000 Western IS fighters with their
own Facebook and Twitter accounts are reported to be playing a
similar role in influencing and shifting political views in their
countries of origin [49].
With the advent of social media platforms, especially YouTube
and Facebook, which support easy uploads of user-generated
content such as videos and photographs, the visualization of
terrorism violence, which is characteristically sensational, can
provide terrorist networks with a powerful tool for legitimacy and
efficacy in radicalization and recruitment, as the internet has done
[7].

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This paper examines the question of how Islamic terrorism
communication; namely propaganda, radicalization and
recruitment to terrorist networks, is supported by Twitter
networks in the hands of self-organizing IS sympathizers and IS
fighters. We examine this question both theoretically and
empirically in a specific and emergent research context of the
rising power of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Research on social
media use by IS terror networks is new but social media network
effect in supporting the IS propaganda, radicalization and
recruitment of new fighters to Syria and Iraq and “lone wolf”
terrorists to city streets needs our urgent research attention.
Hence, our central research question is: How do IS
members/supporters use Twitter for terrorism communication:
propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment? To answer our
research question, we first reviewed relevant literatures to develop
our theoretical framework. We used these following keywords
“propaganda AND (terrorism or terrorist)”, “radicalization AND
Islam”, “radicalization AND ‘Islamic extremism’” and "terrorist
recruitment" in three comprehensive data bases: Scopus, Web of
Science and Science Direct. After having removed the
redundancy, we found 225 articles relevant to this study. After
careful selection, we analyzed an initial set of 56 articles for the
development of our theoretical framework.
We examined the structure of online social media networks that
have dynamically emerged in the aftermath of US-led coalition

airstrikes in October, 2014 as our case study. It is extremely
difficult to identify the IS’s official social media accounts since
social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have
policies to suspend the accounts associated with terrorist
organizations. In this research, therefore, we strategically selected
to observe the Twitter account of @shamiwitness. Prior research
[16, 33] has identified “Shamiwitness” as someone who had been
closely linked to IS terror networks. However, it remains unclear
whether Shamiwitness is a hard-core member of the IS terror
networks or a net-savvy sympathizer of IS terror networks. In one
of his tweets, Shamiwitness has flatly denied his IS membership.
His Twitter account was suspended on December 13, 2014 and his
identity and police arrest were widely reported by international
mass media. Surprisingly, Twitter took the unprecedented step of
reinstating his Twitter account for archival access.
Empirically, we analyzed a total of 3,039 tweets posted by
@shamiwitness during the period from October 6 to October 27,
2014. We conducted trend analysis, social network analysis, and
content analysis of these 3,039 tweets. For trend analysis of
@sshamiwitness’ tweets, we observed the meta-data found in the
tweets including timestamp of tweets and hashtag that embedded
in the tweets.
Through social network analysis, we found 877 unique Twitter
users directly mentioned either through tweets, retweets or replies
in the 3,039 tweets. A retweet (RT) refers to an action of
forwarding other user’s tweet of interest or of importance, while a
reply refers to an action of answering an inquiry tweet. Both RT
and reply tweets usually contain the corresponding Twitter user
name starting with @. By identifying @shamiwitness’
followership, in other words, those who follow him, we can
identify the structure of @shamiwitness social-media network for
further analysis.
In the content analysis, we classify the tweet contents into four
categories: propaganda, radicalization, terrorist recruitment and
others. Propaganda is defined as information, especially of a
biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or
point of view. Radicalization is defined as increasing extremity of
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict
and violence. Very often radicalization occurs in a context of
group identification and response to perceived threat to the ingroup. [39]. Terrorist recruitment is defined as enticing other,
similarly situated young men, to join them in terrorizing and
fighting the jihad war [32]. For tweets that do not satisfy any of
these three categories are classified as “others”.
At this exploratory stage of content analysis, we employed two
Arabic speaking PhD students from Iraq and one English speaking
academic as our raters. They all carefully reviewed all of the
tweets @shamiwitness himself posted but excluded all the
retweets (RTs). In the content analysis, we classify the tweet
contents into four categories: propaganda, radicalization, terrorist
recruitment and others.

5. RESULTS
5.1 Trend Analysis of @shamiwitness Tweets
Our analysis finds that 60% of the tweets in the @shamiwitness
Twitter account represents RTs of tweets posted by other Twitter
users, including some Arabic tweets. The remaining 40% are his
own tweets posted entirely in English, except some Arabic
#hashtags embedded in his English tweets.

Figure 3. Trend analysis: @shamiwitness’ daily posting habit
Figure 3 shows trend analysis of @shamiwitness’ daily Twitter
posting habit. In Figure 3, the red line and green line indicate the
timestamp of the first and last tweet, respectively. Hence, the area
between the two lines indicates his (potential) daily work hours.
On average, his daily work hours can be long, stretching out to 16
hours and 9 minutes per day. As shown in Figure 3, there is not
much variation in his daily tweeting habit (or routine operation)
from day to day. This suggests Shamiwitness’ fanatic/diligent
dedication to operating his @shamiwitness network services like a
business proposition. It certainly does not look like a hobby for
him given the level of time and effort put into his Twitter account.
Figure 4 shows another trend analysis of daily tweets (red line)
and daily total tweet and retweet (black line) posted by
@shamiwitness. On average, @shamiwitness posted 57 his own
tweets and 138 combined tweets and retweets per day, but on
October 18, 2014 he posted only 24 tweets. Upon being asked by
other users, he replied in one of his tweets that he had taken an
administrative leave. Again Figure 4 indicates Shamiwitness’ high
level of commitment to operating his Twitter network services.

Figure 4. Number of daily tweets by @shamiwitness

5.2 Multi-Sided Social-Media Networks
Of the 3,039 tweets we analyzed, there are 877 unique Twitter
users mentioned by @shamiwitness. Shamiwitness and those 877
Twitter users formed dynamic social networks through tweet
exchanges. Figure 5 shows a social network diagram with nodes
(Twitter users) and links (weak/strong social ties represented by
tweet exchanges). Figure 5 is the visualization of the tweet
exchange relationships formed within the @shamiwitness Twitter
networks. It is a useful research tool to examine the structure of
his Twitter networks. Figure 5 clearly indicates four distinct
populations (or networks) of Twitter users: (1) international
media, (2) regional Arabic media, (3) IS sympathizers, and (4) IS

fighters. Of the four distinct networks, the network of
international media is the largest in size, which is measured by the
number of nodes. Within this network of international media,
three largest nodes are shown with a red circle whose size is
computed by the number of followers to that node. In general, the
larger is the size of a node, the greater is social influence (a
megaphone effect) of its tweeting or retweeting to its followers
within a given network. First, the largest network of international
media shows all well-known media: cnnbrk (CNN Breaking
News), nytimes (York Times), bbcworld (BBC World),
washingtonpost (Washington Post) and foreignpolicy (Foreign
Policy), among others. This network also includes journalists,
such as jenanmoussa, brown_moses (citizen journalist), policy
analysts, such as charles_lister and hxhassan, and other
international entities, which are not directly related to IS. Second,
a much smaller network of regional media is also detected which
is characterized by their tweets posted in Arabic. This network
includes cnnarabic (CNN Arabic), aa_arabic (Anadolu Agency, a
press agency in Turkey), skynewsarabia_b (Sky News Arabia),
and ajalive (Al Jazeera). Foreign journalists in posting Arabic
tweets, such as mousaalomar (Moussa al-Omar) and kasimf
(Faisal al-Qassem), are also found in this network of regional
media.
Third, the second largest network of IS sympathizers (or interest
groups), behind the network of international media, consists of
Twitter users who have a special interest in IS. The top of the list
is of course shamiwitness but the network also includes his close

associates with whom he often exchanges short coded tweets,
such as maliwitness, turkwitness, saudiwitness, yemenwitness.
The network of IS sympathizers also include well-known radical
Muslim preachers, anjemchoudary and ahmadmusajibril.
@ahmadmusajibril was specifically mentioned in prior research as
having close ties with IS terrorist networks [16, 33].
Finally, the apparently smallest network of IS fighters includes
Twitter users such as win_or_die2, al_zarkawya_7 and
alhezbr_23. Two of the Twitter usernames show an underscore
“_” followed by version number such as 7 and 23. Many of these
Twitter accounts have been suspended by Twitter under its policy
against tweets in support of terrorism or violence. In consequence,
they open new Twitter accounts by resurrecting their old
usernames but adding a version number so that their followers and
friends can recognize their new accounts. This general practice
among IS fighters whose Twitter accounts were suspended by
Twitter has been found in many of their tweets to @shamiwitness
in this research.
In summary, the social network analysis of the tweet data
obtained through @shamiwitness has identified strong evidence of
multi-sided Twitter networks – four distinct networks of different
populations which used the network service @shamiwitness has
provided for a fairly long period of time.

Figure 5. Multi-sided Twitter networks of users mentioned in @shamiwitness tweets

5.3 Sample @shamiwitness Tweets
The examples in Table 1 aim to show Shamiwitness’
propaganda, recruitment, and radicalization tweets. As
previously discussed, propaganda is information, especially of a
biased or misleading nature, used to promote a particular
political cause or point of view. For propaganda, this is largely

intended to magnify the power of IS, with his tweets mock the
US military miscalculation and inaptitude. Examples shown in
Table 1 have Shamiwitness saying that the US is killing
children, massacring civilians, destroying homes, and is too
fearful to fighting in the streets. His propaganda tweets also
smear and mitigate media and people’ positive perceptions of

PKK as brave and loyal to the Kurdistan region of Iraq. We
selected these earlier dates of our tweet observation period
because of the intensifying battles around and in Kobane – the
center of the US-led coalition airstrikes.
As discussed, radicalization refers to increasing extremity of
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict
and violence. The Shamwitness tweets in Table 1 show these
extreme beliefs. The examples shown ask followers for a call to
arms, being a warrior, and destruction of people and property.
All of these tweets display extreme views that support extreme
political violence.
Finally, as discussed, terrorist recruitment refers to enticing
others, similarly situated young men, to join them in terrorizing
and fighting the jihad war. Understandably, Shami witness has
been well-aware of security risk by being too explicit in online
terrorist recruitment. However, we show three examples of
recruitment from the sample of Shamiwitness tweets. These
examples show him asking Muslim Kurds in Turkey to join the
cause, asking another follower to make a “moral” decision, and
talking about jihad. All of the tweets show the element of
enticing young men to join Islamic terrorism.

Table 1. @shamiwitness tweet examples: Propaganda,
Radicalization, and Recruitment
Timestamp

earlier?
Recruitment
7/10/2014
18:21

This is the time for Muslim Kurds in Turkey to
show whether they can ever counter PKK.

7/10/2014
20:05

@EbuRuana so if it is not right to make dua [the
Islamic act of calling out to Allah] for a kafir [a
disbeliever, someone who rejects Allah and who
does not believe in Muhammad as the final
messenger of Allah], what is the right thing to do
?

11/10/2014
16:29

@banihillal blend in like you are the most antijihadist guy one can think of. @isinlibya
@ummussamah11

12/10/2014
20:14

@DaniyalYasin93 The question is to you:can
you,as a Muslim,counter-argue any of the points
made in that segment quoted from Dabiq
magazine [the IS’ propaganda magazine]?

Notes: [italics] shows our inserted information to help
contexualize his tweet message. Otherwise we did not edit his
tweets.
Note: A Kafir “is a disbeliever, someone who rejects Allah and
who does not believe in Muhammad as the final messenger of
Allah” (http://wikiislam.net/wiki/Kafir)

@shamiwitness Tweet
Propaganda

6/10/2014
10:38

Coalition planes massacred these children in
airstrikes
on
#Hit
,#Anbar
http://t.co/yCsEgkwDY6#Iraq

6/10/2014
17:48

these PKK fellas are exceptional liars.after the
city was almost fully abandoned by civilians,
they now claim 55 thousand civilians there.

7/10/2014
16:08

This is so awesome. US airstrikes also by mistake
hit a Shia militia convoy near Tuz
http://t.co/zUwWcEzBzk 2nd one after the Jabour
strikes

8/10/2014
14:30

Ask the Americans how they liked fighting
JTJ/AQI/MSC/ISI
in
street
wars
in
Ramadi,Fallujah etc. (3)

10/10/2014
4:13

Amazing thing about Kobane:not a single
genuine claim of massacres of civilians. Not
one.Meanwhile, Assad keeps killing kids in
Aleppo
Radicalization

6/10/2014
14:45

@Himalaya888 you do realize IS wants to
destroy every single nation-state,Arab or Kurd or
communist doesnt matter, that they come across?

7/10/2014
18:59

Real warriors, I mean those who are not fags,
dont need air support.

8/10/2014
12:18

#IS blows up police station in downtown Kobane
where YPG were holed up. #Syria

12/10/2014
11:18

Notice this recent uptick of IS activity in Qara
Teppe?
multiple VBIEDs [vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device] hitting PUK
,Pesh,Asayesh ?Guess where else that happened

6. DISCUSSION
Results of our social network analysis of Twitter demonstrate
two important findings. First, social network analysis of Twitter
uers can be a powerful research tool to discover underlying
structure and trends in tweet data, which may not be unearthed
by analyzing traditional media outlets and reports. With Twitter
an individual with an account is able to spend countless hours, as
we have seen with @shamiwitness, trying to influence opinions
of international and regional Arabic mass media, to share some
common knowledge and newest strategic information with IS
fighters, and to radicalize and recruit younger generations of
Muslims and Westerns alike, hence greatly promoting the IS
cause: the Islamic State as a new global political order. Social
media can be very empowering for individuals with political
cause, who may not able to influence traditional media outlets.
Twitter can be used strategically, as we have shown, to
orchestrate multi-sided international networks of supporters and
followers with the explosive speed and reach.
Second, we showed evidence of using Twitter for propaganda,
radicalization, and recruitment. Although @shamiwitness tweets
were carefully posted due to the constant threat of his account
being shut down, we did provide evidence of using an IS
member/supporter-mediated Twitter multi-sided networks for
each of these three activities. This finding shows the extent to
which a deep understanding of such a multi-sided Twitter
network structure and competent and strategic operators who can
exploit such an emergent complex network structure and
dynamic capability can provide government with a new and
credible power on the fight against global terrorism. It follows
that governments need to be more aware that multi-sided socialmedia networks can be exploited by global terrorist networks for
these purposes, and must counter with their own counterterrorism digital policy and proactive online campaigns. The
results show the importance of social media for empowering

individuals, but it also shows the dark side of social media to
wage wars and conflict, which would pose a serious threat to
national security and policy order.

[5]

7. CONCLUSIONS
In light of the very limited literature on social media use by
Islamic terrorism networks in supporting terrorism
communication, we have examined the sophisticated use of
Twitter social media platform by Islamic State terrorist networks
in this paper. By drawing on microeconomic network theories,
we have developed a theoretical framework for examining multisided Twitter networks in the global Islamic terrorism
communication environment. Our social network analysis of the
tweet data generated by @shamiwitness and his Twitter
followers finds strong evidence of the presence of multi-sided
Twitter networks which consist of four distinct Twitter user
populations: international mass media, regional Arabic mass
media, IS fighters, and IS sympathizers. In these multi-sided
Twitter networks, Shamiwitness seems to intermediate different
interests and information needs of these four distinct networks.
By diligently doing so, he can aggregate values created by each
network either to his own benefits (e.g., enhanced self
importance or recognition) or to promoting the global Islamic
terrorist goals of IS.
Our research has both theoretical and methodological
implications for terrorism communication research in our egovernment field. Our research also has policy implications,
calling urgent attention to the potential power of multi-sided
Twitter networks in more effectively and more efficiently
promoting the radical Islamic propaganda, radicalization, and
recruitment messages to the global audiences.
However, our research has inherent limitations by focusing on
@shamiwitness and his Twitter networks. Terrorist networks
tend to change over time because of changes in operational
processes such as recruitment and training as well as changes in
counter-terrorism policies [26]. Future research can apply our
theoretical framework to further investigate the exploitation of
Twitter networks by other terrorist networks or the exploitation
of other social media networks such as YouTube and Facebook
by Islamic State terrorist networks examining how strategic
interactions between information reporters and users can affect
terrorism communication outcomes.
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